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Abstract 
Biosurveillance is one of the primary roles of local Public health offices.  As the all-hazards 
(biological, chemical, and radiation emergencies) approach adds to the responsibilities already 
performed in foodborne illness outbreak response, it is crucial to assess the capabilities and 
robustness of the local public health Foodborne Illness (FBI) response.  By surveying the most 
populated counties in Ohio with a checklist based on the 2009 Council for Improvement of 
Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) guidelines, it was possible to obtain a snapshot of the 
current outbreak response capabilities.  Though only one county reported 100% compliance with 
the checklist, the overall average was 73%.  Minimum requirement items for outbreak response 
were at 83%.  The overall compliance when stratified from “satisfactory” to “good” to 
“excellent” was 83%, 75%, and 64% respectively.  While some local public health offices have 
made some efforts to improve, there is still considerable room for improvement to better handle 
more “disaster level” outbreaks. 
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Foodborne Illness Outbreak Response: A Snapshot of Ohio 
In 2001, the ability of a single terrorist organization to create a disaster of the magnitude 
of the World Trade Center destruction caught many by surprise.  It showed a fundamental flaw 
in our ability to monitor, predict, and appropriately mitigate disasters.  In response, President 
George W. Bush began a process that changed how our government achieved these goals and 
altered the very structure of our national agencies (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1).  
It became clear in this process that simply avoiding the next bombing fell far short of the 
necessary protection our nation requires.  An all-hazards approach was adopted to rectify this 
deficiency and would encompass all potentially disastrous events whether they were man-made 
or natural.   
Literature Review 
Infectious disease became a concern within this new approach as it could be either natural 
or man-made (weaponized) and the complexities involved in the discovery and mitigation of 
these diseases were quickly realized.  Many different government agencies were responsible for 
specific pathogens or specific hosts.  The 2011 E. Coli outbreak in Germany highlights the 
current difficulties with detection and reaction to infectious disease in just such a fractured 
system.  In this outbreak, 3,200 people were sickened and 39 confirmed dead by a single 
bacterial agent, and scientists and physicians of Germany stated the response was slow and 
hindered by inefficiencies at every step of the process (Turner, 2011).  The solution lies in a 
systematic surveillance and response that utilizes rapid communication of emerging issues.    
Biosurveillance, the systematic observation of an area of operations for biological 
hazards, became the tag word for this ultimate process for discovery and reporting of infectious 
disease outbreaks.  Some agencies limit the scope of its definition to automated systems that 
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simply cull data and produce reports (Hoffman, Wilkinson, Bush, Myers, & Griffin, 2003).  
However, the term has grown to embody the entire process of detection and reporting and it is 
this definition the U.S. government uses (Jenkins, 2010).  The goal of biosurveillance was to 
eliminate the barriers of a multi-agency approach by increasing lines of communication and 
possibly create another sub-agency to act as a clearinghouse for all this newly accessible data.   
Federal Deficiencies 
Unfortunately, none of these goals has truly come to fruition.  In the years following 
9/11, Congress mandated the National Academy of Science to form an advisory committee for 
biosurveillance analysis and planning.  The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 (HSPD-
21) did the same for the CDC.  Since that time, nothing has been done to further these 
committees to a definable goal or action (Nuzzo, 2007).  Recently, federal and state governments 
have used biosurveillance funds to develop surveillance tools (such as BioWatch) to be used for 
advance warning.  However, no useful assessments have been made of these systems’ efficacy or 
cost effectiveness (Nuzzo, 2007).  The Department of Homeland Security isn’t without fault in 
this program either.  In 2004, DHS created the National Biosurveillance Integration system.  Its 
intent was to consolidate all incoming inputs on biosurveillance and create threat reports on 
actionable items.  By 2007, the Inspector General of DHS found the program floundering in a 
lack of manning, funding, and, most damaging, a lack of defined goals (Skinner, 2007). 
Major General Stephen Reeves (2011), Former Joint Program Executive Officer for 
Chemical & Biological Defense, Department of Defense (DoD), found in his survey of domestic 
preparedness panel members that even these senior public health officials had a limited 
understanding of the United States’ current path towards its biosurveillance goals.  When asked 
who was in charge of the multidisciplinary biosurveillance program, only 11% correctly 
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responded; “No one.”  41% stated the CDC, which is true for the human health component.  
Reeves’ (2011) goes on to observe, “the present U.S. biosurveillance system is highly dependent 
on state and local public health officials, veterinarians, and agricultural agents to voluntarily 
[communicate] diseases and crop infections.”  A lack of capability in local public health offices 
would, therefore, cripple the entire system. 
Communication Deficiencies  
The communication piece of the biosurveillance puzzle has been the hardest obstacle to 
overcome.  The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)  noted in 2006 that 
meaningful and timely data transmission is one the most significant downfalls of current U.S 
biosurveillance systems. Yet the most recent report from the National Biosurveillance Advisory 
Subcommittee still calls for more common language and more 'data liquidity' between the 
agencies to promote the sharing of information (Vaidyanathan, 2011).  If achieved, this would 
have positive impacts at all levels of public health allowing better analyses to help detect 
relevant patterns in all monitored health complaints.  It is no coincidence that effective 
biosurveillance is essential in the management of catastrophic biological events as well as 
routine public health practice and disaster response (Engel & Lipkin, 2011). 
This two-fold benefit in local public health practice and federal disaster management 
makes one thing perfectly clear: state and local surveillance programs are the foundation for an 
integrated national biosurveillance system (Nuzzo, 2007; DHHS, 2006).  The federal 
government’s ability to obtain situational awareness of bio-disastrous events hangs upon the 
ability of health departments to create flexible lines of communication with the healthcare 
system (Nuzzo, 2007).  However, there is such a large variability within the funding of state and 
local public health agencies that relying upon them for consistent and reliable sharing is a risky 
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venture, at best (Figure 1).  Economic hardship can bring about massive reduction in funding to 
entire programs in efforts to keep others afloat and programs focused on prevention of perceived 
low probability events are often the first to be reduced.   
 
  
Figure 1. Percentage of LHDs with Lower Budget in January 2010 as Compared to 
Previous Year, Excluding One-Time Funding such as ARRA or H1N1 Funding. More than half 
of LHDs have cuts to core funding in 26 states (NACCHO 2010). 
Local Public Health Deficiencies 
Boulton and Rosenberg’s (2011) recent assessment in Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
begins an assessment of state health departments’ epidemiological capacity as they strive to meet 
the needs of biosurveillance and response.  He found the state level health departments had a low 
capacity for foodborne detection and response, mainly citing poor funding for more man-hours 
and a surprising dearth of postgraduate education in the staff.  As it is observed that the federal 
and state agencies have a great deal of work before they can meet their own biosurveillance 
goals, the ability of local public health agencies to contribute is also in doubt. 
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FBI as a Measurement Tool 
In spite of universal confusion at the federal and state level, and the constant economic 
struggles, local public health agencies continue to strive for improved biosurveillance 
capabilities, particularly in the areas they are tasked with (i.e. foodborne illness).  In an all-
hazards approach, the goal is to respond in a structured manner, regardless of the root cause of 
the outbreak.  This makes foodborne illness response a unique opportunity for the researcher 
interested in local public health biosurveillance capabilities.  Bioterrorist events and killer-flu 
epidemics are relatively rare at the state and local level, but foodborne illness is, unfortunately, a 
very common occurrence.  The CDC had 4,638 outbreaks reported to them with 117,136 
illnesses over the ten-year period of 1998 to 2007 (DeWaal, Klein, Catella, Roberts, & Tian, 
2011).  Add to this the well-known fact that many outbreaks are not reported to the CDC for 
various reasons and many more illnesses are not reported to public health.  The CDC posted a 
report that approximated this unknown component in 2010.  They stated roughly 48 million 
people get sick, 128,000 are hospitalized, and 3,000 die from foodborne illness every year.  This 
large number of events makes possible a study that can assess how local health agencies with all-
hazard plans apply those plans by observing their foodborne illness responses.   
Obviously, a great deal of variation may be present from department to department, so a 
universally accepted guideline or procedure would be difficult to find for assessment and 
measurement.  The Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response endeavored to create such 
a guideline in 2009 and distributed it across the nation.  It is far from universally accepted, but it 
is well known.  Ninety-four percent of the states report reviewing it and 58% are comparing their 
procedures against its recommendations (Boulton & Rosenberg, 2011).  The CIFOR guidelines 
do provide a good starting point for comparison of foodborne illness response capacity.  By 
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creating a checklist of the recommended items from CIFOR’s guidelines, local public health 
agencies can be assessed to see how well they can prepare and respond to a biological event.  
Methods 
The CIFOR guidelines do not spell out what is required for a proper foodborne illness 
response at the local public health level.  There is no checklist in the publication to help an 
environmental health office determine what they lack.  However, the guidelines do give a 
comprehensive step-by-step process for a response, and it is within this process that we can 
distill actual people and things required for a maximum response capability.  The author created 
a 29-item checklist with a format that allowed for a binary response format for each item.  For 
example, a reference library was either present or it was not.  No assessment was made of its 
completeness, currency, or accessibility.  This makes it possible to execute an objective 
descriptive study to capture a snapshot of Ohio’s foodborne illness outbreak response.   
The original plan was to survey all 131 county public health offices in the state of Ohio to 
formulate the most accurate snapshot.  However, only counties with populations over 100,000 
were used to capture the state’s local level capacity.  Upon initial contact with smaller counties, 
it became clear that few had internalized the all-hazards approach or had the funding to increase 
capabilities to encompass such an approach.  In their case, it would be possible to assess their epi 
capacity based on FBI outbreaks.  But it would not be appropriate to then make inference about 
their all-hazard’s capabilities due to the difference from larger counties in their internal risk 
assessment, based on funding and populations. 
The checklist was sent via email to a member of the environmental health staff following 
a phone call, where the study was introduced and the rules of the checklist were explained.  This 
was reiterated in the email as well so that a person may refer back to it or in case another person 
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had to fill out the checklist.  Though the Environmental Health Director was sought in most 
cases, other members of the staff were sometimes delegated to complete the checklist (i.e. 
epidemiologist, emergency preparation staff, etc.).  All targeted offices were contacted by phone; 
however, the appropriate person to complete the checklist was not always available.  Twelve out 
of the twenty-five chosen counties responded with a completed checklist.  Three counties were 
sent the checklist via email but did not respond back.  The remaining offices had personnel 
designated as best to complete the checklist but these individuals could not be reached within an 
appropriate timeline (one month) for the completion of the study.   
In order to have an affirmative mark on the checklist, each item from the checklist had to 
be written down somewhere in the office.  It is common for a policy to be known by the office as 
a piece of corporate knowledge.  Unfortunately, it cannot be guaranteed that everyone 
understands that knowledge the same way, if at all.  It may be agreed by everyone that the 
epidemiologist will be the “Team Leader” in the event of an FBI outbreak, but if it was not 
written in a plan for that person to be the leader, the checklist item “Team Leader” could not be 
counted.  This was done to remove as much subjectivity from the responses and maximize 
objective results.  After explanation of this rule was made, it was subject to an honor system that 
each person agreed to abide by upon filling out the checklist. 
The checklist was broken down into three tiers of items, depending on the importance of 
the checklist item.  The items required to meet a minimum level of illness response capability 
were considered “Satisfactory” items (Table 1).  These items were few in number, as it only 
requires a single person and a written plan to execute a basic FBI outbreak response.  Of course, 
this single person is easily overwhelmed by an increased number of patients, limited resources, 
etc.  So, those items from the checklist that improved the county’s ability to have a consistent 
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response even in the face of staff illness, budget constraints, or larger outbreak were labeled 
“Good” items.  The items that maximized the county’s capabilities in all nature of response were 
placed in the “excellent” category.  This stratification was then applied to the returned checklists 
in order to place the county’s overall capabilities into the appropriate category.  
 
Table 1.  Checklist Items Divided by Capability Tier 
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Results 
There was only one Public health office that reported having every single checklist item.  
The lowest reported items were having a laboratory officer and having a checklist for when to 
call for outside help; both were reported at 41%.  The next trend was noted in the periodic 
upkeep items.  “Review and update job descriptions and library”, “exercise teams”, and “debrief 
teams following an FBI” were all reported in range of 50-58%.  Possessing an administrative 
staff person for FBI events was also low at 50%.  Only 5 items were over 90% (epidemiologist, 
public affairs officer, in field experience, reference library, and food illness complaint forms).  
The next highest reported items were all at 83% (Figure 2). 
Once the checklist items were stratified, the reported percentages for the entire group 
were averaged.  Decreasing compliance was noted as tier level increased.  Eighty-three percent 
of items in the “Satisfactory” grouping were met.  Moving to the “Good” category, only 75% of 
the items were met.  Finally, the “Excellent” category only had 64% items met.  This meets the 
common sense test in that as a county moves up the stratification, the added items become more 
difficult or more expensive to achieve.  Looking at the minimum items on the checklist (from the 
“Satisfactory” category), only 83% of the counties had a written plan for an FBI outbreak and the 
counties that had a list of phone numbers for outside agencies was only 75% (Figure 3).   
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Figure 2.  Percent compliance per checklist item (all responses) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.   Combining the items within the stratification then taking the mean of the total 
compliance. 
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Review of total checklist reporting showed the surveyed counties only had 73% of the 
checklist items.  Removing the items from the “Excellent” category, the percentage only 
increases to 77%.   
Discussion 
Looking at the lowest reported items, it is concerning that less than half of the offices 
have a plan for assessing when an outbreak has surpassed their resources.  The implication, then, 
is that they play-it-by-ear for each outbreak and call for help when things get out of hand.  
Unfortunately, the CIFOR guidelines rightly point out that asking for help early can make or 
break an effective response.  Knowing in advance if an outbreak may have the numbers to 
overcome the manpower or finances of an office is crucial in asking for help.  Similar mistakes 
were made in New Orleans and Louisiana following hurricane Katrina, and the response was 
severely hindered. 
Commonly, a nurse in the public health office serves as the impromptu laboratory person 
in an outbreak, so it is not inappropriate that the item is low in compliance.  Indeed, most of the 
counties that marked the category affirmatively were expecting their nurse to fill the role.   
As is seen in many offices regardless of the program, it is the upkeep tasks that are often 
forgotten or glazed over.  When a program is first implemented, there may be a great deal of 
energy and dedication to the endeavor; however, as time passes and other duties creep into play, 
the attention on the program may wane.  So it is not surprising that “exercising team members,” 
“debriefing members following an event,” and “library and supply checking” are not routinely 
accomplished.  Unfortunately, these tasks may become crucial deficiencies when there are no 
outbreaks to sharpen a team’s skills upon.  Can an office be so effective at prevention that it 
becomes complacent in response? 
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It is interesting that not every office had a response plan, particularly when ODH supplies 
one to all of its county offices, if they desire it.  As with any emergency response, failure to have 
a practiced plan in place is paramount to failure.  Though forcing a binary response from the 
county may miss a lesser degree of compliance, as the main team may know what to do well 
enough to not require anything in writing.  Even still, there are times when those members may 
be replaced with less knowledgeable people and they would have nowhere to find answers.  
It was difficult to place “have prepared contact list for outside agencies” within the 
stratification levels.  The decision to place it into the minimum requirements or “satisfactory” 
category was done in light of minimally staffed offices.  If it was easy to be overwhelmed due to 
a lack of personnel and resources, then having a phone list of people to call when help was 
needed would be vital.  Of course, it could be argued that if there is a list of phone numbers, 
there should be plan on when to use it (i.e. prepared plan for when to ask for help, item 24).  
However, it is sometimes easier for a single person to know when they are overwhelmed versus a 
team.  If poor communication exists between a team, the members may mistakenly rely upon one 
another when no one is actually completing key tasks. 
Recommendations 
Accreditation could answer for not just the quality of one public health office’s response, 
but the continuity of all other accredited offices as well.  As an extension of this thinking, a 
specialized checklist for the Ohio Department of Health would be equally beneficial as crucial 
details could be elucidated.  What does ODH expect of county public health offices during 
foodborne outbreaks?  What resources does ODH make available to these offices for such 
events?  What does ODH do to better prepare local public health offices for outbreaks?  A future 
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study would do a great service if it asked these questions and expanded on the details of this 
study.   
A final point of discussion, as it repeatedly comes up in this and many other papers in 
regards to foodborne illness investigation: communication.  Despite many advances in the 
Internet over the last decade, its use in foodborne outbreak response is in its infancy.  Even the 
CIFOR guidelines treat the unified program with a nebulous mention of using PulseNet or 
equivalent.  The simple fact that there is no single national program to which public health may 
actively communicate outbreaks is a travesty.  This is again where accreditation, from a high 
enough level, could make new headway breaking down the walls of autonomy local public 
health has built around it.  The time has arrived for public to know that not all outbreaks are local 
and a coordinated response is the only effective mitigation strategy.   
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations in this study that should be acknowledged.  Foremost is 
the use of the CIFOR guidelines as the foundation of the study.  Though it is an excellent 
document; as noted earlier, it is not universally accepted, nor is it the most exhaustive review of 
the topic.  The World Health Organization’s own white paper on foodborne outbreak would be 
closer to that mark.  CIFOR did provide a reasonably concise and well dispersed document, 
making it superior for this study, however.  The limited scope of the population sampled also 
diminishes this study’s strength.  City public health offices were not included due to differences 
in funding and chain-of-command from county offices, which would have required a modified 
checklist to better account for these differences.  The response rate further limited the strength of 
the findings.  The greatest limiting issue, however, lies in what wasn’t incorporated in the 
checklist.  By restraining items to only those found in the CIFOR guidelines, many items that 
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indirectly effect outbreak response were left out.  One such item would be accreditation.  A 
public health office accredited by a state or federal regulatory agency would have likely 
answered all the checklist questions in order to gain accreditation. 
Conclusion 
Recent review has shown that local public health offices have low capacity for 
biosurveillance.  This study shows that there are key areas where improvement could be made to 
better facilitate an all-hazards approach to biosurveillance.  Namely, these areas involve 
inadequate personnel, poor plan implementation, and a lack of practice and review of past 
responses.  They should strive for a continuous improvement model that does not routinely sit 
upon previous laurels and miss opportunities for better response.  One county was particularly 
vocal about this.  Their Environmental Health Director explained that they had just undergone a 
“CIFOR Overhaul” in that last year.  This consisted of a full resource review combined with 
CIFOR training for all appropriate personnel and will soon be complete with a system test 
through tabletop exercises.  Needless to say, they found this study’s checklist quite easy to 
complete.  It isn’t until all of the major counties adopt a similar approach to foodborne illness 
that they will have the capacity to offer a true all-hazards detection and mitigation program.   
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Appendix 1 
 
CIFOR County Checklist 
 
1. Designated Team leader         ____ 
2. Epidemiologic investigator        ____ 
3. Laboratory investigator        ____ 
4. Public information Officer        ____ 
5. Established Emergency response unit      ____ 
6. Appropriate training in individual duties      ____ 
7. In-field experience of individual duties      ____ 
8. Individual job descriptions and expected tasks and duties    ____ 
9. Prepared response protocol        ____ 
10. Prepared contact list for notification (especially of external agencies)  ____ 
11. Assembled reference library about foodborne illness and control   ____ 
measures 
12. Review/update job descriptions, contact lists, and reference library  ____ 
  at least annually 
13. Provide team members with continuing education opportunities   ____ 
14. Exercise teams together to foster knowledge and team building   ____ 
15. Conduct debriefing following every real world event and create   ____ 
lessons learned 
16. Have at least one admin staff person for just FBI investigation   ____ 
17. Have at least one legal counsel       ____ 
18. Have equipment and supplies to perform investigations    ____ 
19. Have scheduled review of supplies to ensure up to date and no    ____ 
expired supplies 
20. Laboratory test requisition forms       ____ 
21. Access to Pulsenet or equivalent state-wide notification system   ____ 
22. Training for Pulsenet or equivalent state-wide notification system  ____  
23. Have template for communications with public     ____ 
24. Have checklist for determining if outside help is needed early   ____ 
25. Have a formal process in place for initial notifications    ____ 
26. Standardized outbreak questionnaires       ____ 
27. Environmental assessment forms       ____ 
28. Chain-of-custody forms         ____  
29. Food illness complaint worksheets      ____ 
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Appendix 2 
County Map 
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Appendix 3 
List of Public Health Competencies Met 
 
Specific Competencies 
Domain #1: Analytic Assessment Skill 
Defines a problems 
Determines appropriate uses and limitations of both quantitative and qualitative data 
Selects and defines variables relevant to defined public health problems 
Identifies relevant and appropriate data and information sources 
Evaluates the integrity and comparability of data and identifies gaps in data sources 
Applies ethical principles to the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data and information 
Partners with communities to attach meaning to collected quantitative and qualitative data 
Makes relevant inferences from quantitative and qualitative data 
Obtains and interprets information regarding risks and benefits to the community 
Applies data collection processes, information technology applications, and computer systems 
storage/retrieval strategies 
Recognizes how the data illuminates ethical, political, scientific, economic, and overall public health issues 
Domain #2: Policy Development/Program Planning Skills 
Collects, summarizes, and interprets information relevant to an issue 
States policy options and writes clear and concise policy statements 
Articulates the health, fiscal, administrative, legal, social, and political implications of each policy option 
States the feasibility and expected outcomes of each policy option 
Utilizes current techniques in decision analysis and health planning 
Decides on the appropriate course of action 
Develops a plan to implement policy, including goals, outcome and process objectives, and 
implementation steps 
Translates policy into organizational plans, structures, and programs 
Develops mechanisms to monitor and evaluate programs for their effectiveness and quality 
Domain #3: Communication Skill 
Communicates effectively both in writing and orally, or in other ways 
Solicits input from individuals and organizations 
Advocates for public health programs and resources 
Leads and participates in groups to address specific issues 
Effectively presents accurate demographic, statistical, programmatic, and scientific information for 
professional and lay audiences 
Attitudes 
Listens to others in an unbiased manner, respects points of view of others, and promotes the expression of 
diverse opinions and perspectives 
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Specific Competencies 
Domain #4: Cultural Competency Skills 
Utilizes appropriate methods for interacting sensitively, effectively, and professionally with persons from 
diverse cultural, socioeconomic, educational, racial, ethnic and professional backgrounds, and persons of 
all ages and lifestyle preferences 
Identifies the role of cultural, social, and behavioral factors in determining the delivery of public health 
services 
Develops and adapts approaches to problems that take into account cultural differences 
Attitudes 
Understands the dynamic forces contributing to cultural diversity 
Understands the importance of a diverse public health workforce 
Domain #5: Community Dimensions of Practice Skills 
Establishes and maintains linkages with key stakeholders 
Utilizes leadership, team building, negotiation, and conflict resolution skills to build community 
partnerships 
Collaborates with community partners to promote the health of the population 
Identifies how public and private organizations operate within a community 
Identifies community assets and available resources 
Develops, implements, and evaluates a community public health assessment 
Describes the role of government in the delivery of community health services 
Domain #6: Basic Public Health Sciences Skills 
Identifies the individual’s and organization’s responsibilities within the context of the Essential Public 
Health Services and core functions 
Defines, assesses, and understands the health status of populations, determinants of health and illness, 
factors contributing to health promotion and disease prevention, and factors influencing the use of health 
services 
Understands the historical development, structure, and interaction of public health and health care 
systems 
Identifies and applies basic research methods used in public health 
Applies the basic public health sciences including behavioral and social sciences, biostatistics, 
epidemiology, environmental public health, and prevention of chronic and infectious diseases and injuries 
Identifies and retrieves current relevant scientific evidence 
Identifies the limitations of research and the importance of observations and interrelationships 
Attitudes 
Develops a lifelong commitment to rigorous critical thinking 
Domain #7: Financial Planning and Management Skills 
Applies budget processes 
Develops strategies for determining budget priorities 
Monitors program performance 
Applies basic human relations skills to the management of organizations, motivation of personnel, and 
resolution of conflicts 
Conducts cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit, and cost utility analyses 
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Specific Competencies 
Domain #8: Leadership and Systems Thinking Skills 
Creates a culture of ethical standards within organizations and communities 
Helps create key values and shared vision and uses these principles to guide action 
Identifies internal and external issues that may impact delivery of essential public health services (i.e. 
strategic planning) 
Facilitates collaboration with internal and external groups to ensure participation of key stakeholders 
Promotes team and organizational learning 
Contributes to development, implementation, and monitoring of organizational performance standards 
Uses the legal and political system to effect change 
Applies the theory of organizational structures to professional practice 
 
